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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code Ann.. Sec. 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court correctly apply the Dolan "rough proportionality" test 
in determining that no unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compensation 
occurred in this case under the United States or Utah constitutions? 
ISSUE NO. 2.: Did the trial court correctly determine that no violation of the Equal 
Protection clause of the United States Constitution, or the "uniform operation of laws" clause 
of the Utah Constitution, occurred in this case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
BAM incorrectly posits the applicable standard of appellate review. While BAM asserts 
that the standard of appellate review is "correctness,"whether the trial court correctly applied 
a legal standard to a particular factual situation, is a question of fact reviewed under a "clearly 
erroneous" standard of appellate review.1 Even with respect to constitutional issues, such as 
whether due process was provided in a particular situation, the clearly erroneous standard 
applies to the "necessary subsidiary factual determinations."2 
Whether a trial court has utilized the correct legal standard is a question of law reviewed 
\ UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(a)(MFindings of fact...shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous... ."), Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,125, 100 P.3d 1177. 
2
. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,125, 100 P.3d 1177. 
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for correctness on appeal.3 However, the issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly applied the "rough proportionality" takings test to the particular facts of this case. 
Even if the "rough proportionality" standard is viewed as a mixed question of law and fact, the 
clearly erroneous standard will be applied to the subsidiary factual questions.4 
Under a "clearly erroneous" standard, the appellate court will not set aside a trial court's 
findings of fact unless "the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence."5 
3
. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 
35, UK 21, 25, 140 P.3d 1200. 
4
. Cf. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey. Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 721, 
119 S.Ct. 1624, 1644 (1999)(whether land use decision substantially advances legitimate 
public interests is viewed as mixed question of fact and law); cf. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 
14, f 35, 152 P.3d 321 ("The due process claim presents a mixed question of fact and law 
that we review de novo for correctness. But we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard 
for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations."). 
5
. Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting In re Estate of 
Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Utah R. App. P., 24(a)(7)) 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: Plaintiff/Appellant B.A.M. Development, LLC 
[hereinafter, "BAM"], a subdivision developer, claims that Defendant/Appellee Salt Lake 
County [hereinafter, the "County"] violated BAM's constitutional guarantees of just 
compensation for takings of private property, and of equal protection by requiring an "exaction" 
of a segment of BAM's property where it adjoins an existing highway as a condition of the 
County's approval of a proposed subdivision plan, to-wit: a dedication of certain land for future 
road widening. 
After a bench trial in 20016 in which new evidence was received, the trial court entered 
judgment against BAM on all claims. On BAM's first appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held 
that the trial court wrongly received new evidence and that the County had failed to conduct an 
administrative hearing on BAM's takings claims, and remanded for such a hearing. The Utah 
Supreme Court then granted the parties' cross-petitions for certiorari, and ultimately held that 
(a) the district court had properly received new the evidence, and (b) the "rough proportionality" 
test of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in the Nollan and Dolan cases applied to 
the exaction at issue in this case. The Supreme Court remanded, directing the trial court to 
conduct a "rough proportionality review," taking additional evidence and considering the prior 
6The original trial and appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme 
Court in this matter are referred to collectively hereinafter as "BAM I." 
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trial record. After trial on remand, the trial court held in favor of the County on all claims, 
finding that the "rough proportionality" test was satisfied. BAM now appeals again. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
• August 14, 1998 - BAM's Complaint filed in Third District Court [R. 1-13]. 
• April 23 and 24, 2001 - Bench trial before Honorable Timothy R. Hanson [R. 
353, 354 (internal pagination, pp. 1 - 330)]. 
• June 8, 2001 - Trial court entered a Memorandum Decision finding in favor of 
the County on all claims asserted in BAM's Complaint, and directing the 
County's counsel to prepare proposed findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
[R. 247-252]. 
• July 30, 2001 - Trial court entered a second Memorandum Decision finding that 
(a) BAM had not timely objected to the County's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; and (b) the County's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law accurately represented the court's decision [R. 258 - 259]. 
The same day, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
[R. 266 -273], and Judgment for Defendant [R. 274 - 275]. 
• August 1, 2001 - BAM simultaneously filed in the trial court a "Motion for Entry 
of New and/or Additional Findings" and "Motion for New Trial" [R. 276 - 279] 
along with a purported "Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact"[R. 280 - 291]. 
• September 19, 2001 - Trial court filed a third Memorandum Decision, denying 
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BAM's Motion for Entry of New and/or Additional Findings and Motion for 
New Trial [R. 335-337]. 
• October 15, 2001 - Trial court entered Order denying BAM's Motion for Entry 
of New and/or Additional Findings [R. 338 -340]. 
• October 18, 2001 - BAM filed Notice of Appeal and bond [R. 341 - 344]. 
• February 20, 2004 - Court of Appeals issued decision, B.A.M. Development 
LLC, and Utah limited liability company v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, 
87P.3d710[R. 355A-355Rr]. 
• August 6, 2004 - Utah Supreme Court grants parties' cross-petitions for writs of 
certiorari on three issues [R. 360-361]. 
• January 10, 2006 - Utah Supreme Court issued (amended) decision, B.A.M. 
Development LLC, and Utah limited liability company v. Salt Lake County, 2006 
UT App 2,128 P.3d 1161. Remand ordered for further trial proceedings "for the 
purpose of conducting a rough proportionality review." Id., 2006 UT App 2, 
148, 128 P.3d at 1171 [R. 431-445].7 
• October 17, 2006 - Trial court conducts further trial proceedings pursuant to 
remand order [R. 538-540, transcript 572 (internal pagination 1-177)]. 
• January 11, 2007-Trial court enters "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Remand" determining the County properly applied the "rough 
7The original trial and appeals before the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme 
Court in this matter are referred to collectively hereinafter as "BAM I." 
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proportionality" test and dismissed BAM's claims [R. 554-561]. 
• February 8, 2007 - Plaintiff/Appellant BAM Development filed Notice of 
Appeal [R. 564-565]. 
2. Statement of Facts8 
a. On July 30,1997, Salt Lake County ["the County"] received the application and 
proposed plat of plaintiff B.A.M. Development [ "BAM"] for its proposed 
Westridge Meadows subdivision ["Westridge Subdivision"] to be developed at 
approximately 7700 West 3500 South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. 
BAM's proposed plat included a 40-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street 
running along the north boundary of BAM's property. 
b. On August 26, 1997, BAM's subdivision proposal was approved by Salt Lake 
County engineering and development staff, subject to compliance with County 
road standards, including a 40-foot wide right-of-way ["ROW"] dedication of 
BAM's land abutting 3500 South street for future road width. 
c. The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County 
Ordinance §15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-
801. Under certain circumstances, the County ordinance required dedication of 
8This Statement of Facts substantially adopts the "Findings of Fact" as entered by 
the trial court [R. 554-561]. BAM did not object to the proposed "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order" when submitted to the trial court in accordance with 
UTAH R. CIV. P., Rule 7(f)(2). In its opening brief, BAM does not directly challenge any 
specific finding(s) of fact entered by the trial court. 
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highway ROW space by developers of property abutting a major or secondary 
highway in accordance with the County's Transportation Master Plan. 
The County relied upon traffic projections and recommendations of the Wasatch 
Front Regional Council and the Utah Department of Transportation ["UDOT"] 
in formulating its Transportation Master Plan. The road-width recommendations 
of the Wasatch Front Regional Council were based upon a long-range 
transportation study projecting highway capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the 
year 2020. 
On or about June 10, 1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed 
by the Wasatch Front Regional Council and UDOT that the currently required 
highway ROW for 3500 South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width 
(i.e., 53-foot half-width). The County then incorporated the revised ROW 
requirement into its Transportation Master Plan. 
On or about June 15,1998, Andrea Pullos, the County's transportation engineer, 
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt 
Lake County roadway standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW 
dedication of 3500 South street. 
On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval 
to BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway ROW dedication at 3500 
South Street. 
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On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning Commission's 
dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40-feet. BAM's 
appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed 
by the County. 
On July 15, 1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal. 
On June 23,1999, the County Planning Commission approved BAM's amended 
subdivision plat, which had been modified by BAM to include the required 53-
foot highway dedication. 
On August 18,1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final approval 
of the Westridge Subdivision plat with the 53-foot highway dedication. 
On August 27, 1999, the Westridge Subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision. 
The increase of the highway ROW dedication required of BAM from 40-feet to 
53-feet resulted in a loss to BAM of one building lot in the Westridge 
subdivision. 
In or around April, 1998, Andrea Pullos, the County transportation engineer, 
conducted an analysis of historical and projected traffic volumes on 3500 South 
street in the "traffic link" between 7200 West and 8400 West streets. 
BAM's proposed development was located within this traffic link at 
approximately 7700 West. 
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p. Transportation engineers typically study traffic patterns on a given street by 
isolating a "traffic link" on the street between major intersecting cross streets. 
q. Ms. Pullos' traffic analysis relied, in part, upon historical traffic data compiled 
by UDOT reflecting increasing traffic volume on 3500 South street within the 
7200 West-8400 West link. 
r. As a result of her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that BAM's proposed 
subdivision development was likely to generate an additional 440 vehicle trips 
per day on 3500 South street. This calculation assumed ten (10) vehicle trips per 
day per additional housing unit. 
s. The assumption often (10) vehicle trips per day per household is a generally 
recognized standard in the field of transportation engineering. 
t. Ms. Pullos determined that the additional 440 vehicle trips per day likely to be 
generated by BAM's proposed development represented an increased traffic 
volume of 3.04% on 3500 South street within the traffic link. 
u. In conducting her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that the impact of the 
3.04% increased traffic volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed 
development was roughly proportionate to the additional land required for 
highway dedication by BAM, as a percentage of the entire parcel owned by 
BAM. 
v. The area of the entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the Westridge 
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Subdivision consisted of 619,781.54 square feet. 
The additional 13-feet of highway dedication area required to be dedicated by 
BAM was 11,696.23 square feet (i.e., 13 feet multiplied by 899.71 lineal feet, the 
length of the frontage of BAM's parcel abutting 3500 South street). 
Therefore, the additional dedication required of BAM represented 1.89% of the 
entire BAM parcel (11,696.23/619,781.54 = .01887). 
The additional 13-feet of highway dedication area required to be dedicated by 
BAM resulted in the loss of one building lot, from 45 lots to 44 lots. 
Therefore, the dedication resulted in a loss to BAM of 2.22% of its available 
building lots (1/45-.02222). 
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SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant's brief fails to marshal the evidence and cite the record 
2. The trial court correctly determined that the County made an "individualized 
determination" of "rough proportionality" between the required development exaction and the 
likely impact of BAM's proposed development. 
3. The trial court correctly determined that no violation of the Equal Protection 
clause of the United States Constitution, or the "uniform operation of laws" clause of the Utah 
Constitution, occurred in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
1 
Appellant's Brief Fails to Marshal the Evidence and Cite the Record 
BAM fails to comply with the briefing requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure by not marshaling evidence and citing to the record. In such circumstances, a 
reviewing court should "disregard those portions of [the] brief that [are] inadequate."9 
Moreover, the reviewing court may presume that the decision below was correct10 and "decline 
to address its merits."11 
(A) BAM Has an Obligation to Marshal the Evidence 
9
 Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Utah. 2004 UT 18, f 16, 89 
P.3dl31. 
10
 Koulisv. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
11
 Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures. Inc.. 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997). 
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BAM's brief is unclear as to whether it challenges the district court's findings of fact, 
or merely the application of the Dolan "rough proportionality" takings test to the relevant facts 
of this case12. BAM must "marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing 
it in a light most favorable to the court below."13 "A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged findings."14 BAM "cannot dodge this 
duty by attempting to frame the issues as legal ones. Because the question of [rough 
proportionality] is so dependent on factual findings, [it] must marshal the evidence if it seeks 
to challenge the trial court's determination of that question."15 
(B) BAM Has Not Met its Marshaling Obligation 
The Utah Supreme Court recently explained the particularly rigorous character of the 
obligation to marshal the evidence as follows: 
The process of marshaling is thus fundamentally different from that of presenting the 
evidence at trial. The challenging party must "temporarily remove its own prejudices and 
fully embrace the adversary's position;" he or she must play the "devil's advocate." 
12Although BAM's brief does seem to criticize the district court's underlying 
factual findings where its applies the rough proportionality test. See, e.g., Appellant's 
Opening Brief ("BAM's Brief), p. 24. 
13
. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 
35,1| 24, 140 P.3d 1200 (quoting State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, | 17, 124 P.3d 235). 
14
. UTAHR. APP. P. 24(a)(9)(emphasis added). 
15
. Cf. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds. 2006 
UT 35, f 25, 140 P.3d 1200 (regarding whether waiver had occurred in the circumstances; 
court characterized the issue as "extremely fact-sensitive"). 
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Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, \ 19, 57 P.3d 1093. In so doing, appellants must present 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court, Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 
958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998), and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light 
favorable to their case. In re Estate of Bartell, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record 
in support of their position. [Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 
872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct.App.1994)]. Nor can they simply restate or review 
evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's 
finding of fact. Wilson Supply, 2002 UT 94 at f 22, 54 P.3d 1177. Furthermore, 
appellants cannot shift the burden of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Id. This would inappropriately force an 
appellee to marshal the evidence in order to refute an appellant's assertion of the absence 
of evidence. Id. In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party must 
demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those 
findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence. 
Citing Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1054.16 The trial court's ultimate decision upholding the County may 
be supported by reference to the whole record of evidence presented in the trial court during the 
two proceedings.17 In Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, ^ 82, 100 P.3d 1177, the Utah Supreme 
Court clarified that even if the trial court has erroneously referred to some aspect of the legal 
standard involved, if the whole record supports the trial court's decision, then it will be upheld: 
Defendants claim that there is "no evidence" supporting the trial court's findings. Their 
assertion, however, does not satisfy the marshaling requirements. In situations where 
there is virtually nothing in the record that would support the trial court's findings, a 
claim of no evidence might be sufficient. However, an appellee need only point to a 
scintilla of evidence that supports a court's findings in order to refute an appellant's claim 
of no evidence (emphasis added). 
BAM fails in its present appeal to marshal the evidence to establish a lack of substantial 
16
. Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, Tj 78, 100 P.3d 1177. 
17
. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management. 2005 UT App 430, If 20, 124 P.3d 269 
("[Only] if absolutely no evidence exists in the record to support the district court's 
finding, that finding is clearly erroneous.")(Emphasis added). 
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record evidence in support of specific findings or subordinate factual matter in mixed law/fact 
issues. 
(C) No citations to record indicating issues were preserved for appeal 
BAM's brief does not comply with UTAHR. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A) which requires "citation 
to the record showing that [each] issue was preserved in the trial court." Without such citation, 
the reviewing court may presume that the issues involved were not properly preserved in the 
trial court, and hence may properly "decline to address its merits."18 
(D) No citations to record for statements of fact 
In addition, BAM's brief does not comply with UTAHR. APP. P. 24(a)(7) which requires 
that "All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record ... ,"19 When a brief "makes ...bald statement [s of fact], unaccompanied 
by any relevant citation to the record," an appellate court may properly "decline to address its 
merits."20 Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence in the record supports the ultimate 
conclusion upholding the County's action. The Findings are merely the intermediate step.21 It 
18
.Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures. Inc.. 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997). 
19
. UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(7); West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, If 32, 135 
P.3d 874. 
20Rukavina. supra. 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997). 
21
. See Neelv v. Bennett 2002 UT App 189, f 12, 51 P.3d 724 ("The marshaled 
facts should 'correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings,1 
supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record, and only then should an 
appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged findings are clearly erroneous."). 
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is only when the ultimate conclusion is "against the clear weight of the evidence," in light of 
the whole record, that a trial court decision can be held to be "clearly erroneous."22 
2 
The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the County Made an "Individualized 
Determination" of "Rough Proportionality" Between the Required Development 
Exaction and the Likely Impact of RAM's Proposed Development. 
(A) The "rough proportionality" standard generally 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,23 the City of Tigard, Oregon imposed two easement-
dedication conditions on the grant of a permit to expand the size of a hardware store and pave 
part the store's parking lot. One condition required dedication of a bike-path easement; the 
other, dedication of a flood-plain easement. The United States Supreme Court held that the 
City's action met the deferential "essential nexus" standard of judicial review, because the bike-
path easement sought to address the problem of traffic in the downtown area, and the flood-
plain easement sought to address the problem of additional flooding that might result from 
paving of the parking lot. The Court held, however, that the City failed to meet an additional 
requirement, which it dubbed the "rough proportionality" standard. 
The "rough proportionality" standard required that the City must: (1) determine the 
nature and extent of the impact of the project as proposed by the applicant; then (2) tailor any 
22
 See, e.g., Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
23
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 
(1994). 
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conditions on the permit to be "roughly proportional" to addressing the nature and extent of 
such actual impacts anticipated from the development. The City, however, had only a 
generalized study of the potential impact of additional development in the downtown area. The 
Court held that rough proportionality requires an "individualized determination" matching the 
impacts from the proposed development with the conditions imposed to address such impacts. 
Significantly, the Court did not require a perfect one-to-one correspondence between the 
impacts and such conditions. Only a "rough proportionality" between the two is required. 
For example, suppose that the City of Tigard had done a study showing that the 
applicant's project as proposed, increasing the size of the hardware store, would generate an 
additional 50 car-trips per week, and because of the paving of the parking lot, would generate 
an additional 1,000 gallons of runoff. Suppose further that the bike-path easement condition 
would have prevented 45 car-trips per week, and that the flood plain easement condition would 
have accommodated 900 gallons of runoff. Although the conditions thus would not have a one-
to-one correspondence to the evils sought to be addressed, they nonetheless probably would 
have been "roughly proportional" to alleviation of those evils, and hence constitutional. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in BAM I that the Utah Legislature required the "rough 
proportionality" standard in Utah,24 and that the standard applied in this case even though the 
operative facts in this dispute arose before the Legislature applied the "rough proportionality" 
standard to development exactions in its 2005 Local Land Use Development Management 
24
. B.A.M. Development. L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County. 2006 UT 2, ^ 28, 128 P.3d 
1161 (interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-507 (Supp.2005). 
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Amendments (S.B. 60). 
(B) Apples and oranges must be compared 
There is little doubt that the "rough proportionality" standard requires comparison of 
"apples and oranges," i.e., things that superficially seem incomparable. Thus, the impact of a 
proposed development project on the public may be in the form of additional vehicle trips per 
day ("apples"), whereas the exaction demanded from the developer by the government may be 
in the form of a required dedication ("oranges"). 
And it is perhaps for that reason that the United States Supreme Court in Dolan 
emphasized that only "rough proportionality" between the impact of the proposed development 
on the public and the burden on the developer imposed by the exaction demanded is required. 
This "apples and oranges" dimension of the "rough proportionality" standard has 
emerged in the cases decided by courts of other states applying the Dolan standard. For 
example, in Sparks v. Douglas County, 127 Wash.2d 901, 904 P.2d 738 (1995), Douglas 
County conditioned approval of the Sparkses' short plat applications upon dedication of rights 
of way for road improvements. The Sparkses argued "there is no way to truly measure whether 
the conditions demanded by the County are proportionate to the impact of the development." 
Id, 127 Wash.2d 901, 915, 904 P.2d 738, 745 (1995). The Court disagreed, holding instead 
that: 
While Dolan disregarded precise calculations in analyzing development impacts, it ruled 
that local government must make some effort to quantify its findings to support its 
permit conditions. In this case, the findings made by the County were more than mere 
conclusory statements of general impact. They were the result of the kind of 
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individualized analysis required under Dolan. The report prepared by the Planning 
Office for each of the short plats documented the deficiencies in right of way width and 
surfacing of the adjoining streets. Douglas County's records also reflect calculation of 
increase in traffic and the specific need for dedication of rights-of-way based upon the 
individual and cumulative impacts of the series of short subdivisions. 
The findings upon which the County relies reflect the required rough proportionality 
between the exactions and the impact of the Respondents' proposed developments. It is 
undisputed that the developments would generate increased traffic on adjacent roads 
which are not adequate for safe access under county standards. The County has, in the 
process of individualized analysis, satisfied the final step of the Dolan test.25 
In contrast, in Burton v. Clark County. 91 Wash. App. 505, 958 P.2d 343 (1998), the 
county conditioned its approval of a three-lot short plat on the landowner's dedicating a 
right-of-way and building a road, curbs and sidewalks. There was no evidence, however, of an 
"individualized determination" that the mere subdivision of the land would impose any 
additional burden on traffic. Accordingly, the court found that a taking had occurred. 
Similarly, in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. Partnership, 135 S.W.3d 
620, 644-45 (Tex. 2004), the Town required that a subdivision developer improve abutting 
streets that did not meet specified standards, even if the improvements were not necessary to 
accommodate the impact of the subdivision. The Texas Supreme Court held that the 
requirement constituted a taking because the Town had failed to show the required 
improvements bore any relationship to the impact of the development on the road or on the 
Town's roadway system as a whole. 
Accordingly, it is not necessary for the County to convert the impact on public 
25
. Sparks v. Douglas County. 127 Wash.2d 901, 915, 904 P.2d 738, 745-46 (1995). 
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infrastructure by the developer and the exaction imposed by the County on the developer into 
money terms in order to demonstrate whether the two are "roughly proportional." Dolan 
recognized that the two sides of the equation might be incommensurable, in that they lacked a 
basis of comparison with respect to a quality or defining characteristic normally subject to 
comparison, but that they could be demonstrably "roughly proportional" nevertheless. 
In this case, the trial court record amply demonstrates evidence that the "rough 
proportionality" standard was satisfied by the County. 
(C) The trial court's record and decision demonstrate that "rough proportionality" 
existed here 
The Utah Supreme Court in BAM I expressed the rough proportionality standard as 
follows: 
The rough proportionality test as extracted from Nollan and Dolan has two components: 
first an inquiry into the presence of an " 'essential nexus'... between the 'legitimate state 
interest5 " and the land dedication requirement and second, "some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development."26 
1. The "Essential nexus" Component 
The "essential nexus" component is clearly met here. It is unquestionable that the 
exaction sought to address the legitimate governmental objective of providing for increased 
traffic in the area by providing space for road expansion. Thus, a direct qualitative nexus exists 
between the exaction, i.e., a dedication of land for expanded road width, and the governmental 
26
. B.A.M. Development. L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County. 2006 UT 2, f 40, 128 P.3d 
1161 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 
837-38, 107 S.Ct. 3141)). 
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objective of providing safe and adequate public roads. This standard is indistinguishable from 
the rational relationship review typically applied in the due process area. And, nowhere in its 
brief does BAM challenge whether the "essential nexus" prong has been satisfied. 
2. The "Rough Proportionality" Component 
The "rough proportionality" component demands a seemingly simple analysis: 
(A) Is the required exaction (i.e., the road dedication) — 
(B) related both in nature and extent -
(C) to the impact of the proposed development on public infrastructure (i.e., 
increased traffic volume). 
The requisite "rough" equivalency determined through this comparison can be reduced 
to this basic algebraic expression: 
e &I 
where V = the exaction, and "/" = the impact. 
Here, the trial court record, and the ultimate decision, make it clear that in any rational 
manner of executing this comparison, a rough proportionality is to be found between the 
"exaction" and the "impact" in this case. The trial court first concluded that BAM had not 
properly preserved a challenge to the first 40-feet of the exaction27 because it had failed to 
27BAM obviously intended and expected to dedicate the first 40-feet of land for 
highway right-of-way. See Trial (October 17, 2006) Exhibit D-57 (BAM only protested 
the additional 13-foot dedication requirement). 
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appeal that decision through available County administrative procedures. For the same reason, 
the Utah Supreme Court in BAM I similarly limited its "review to the thirteen-foot 
supplemental exaction."29 The Utah Supreme Court has held that administrative procedures 
must be exhausted before a constitutional takings challenge under the Utah constitution can be 
brought.30 Accordingly, in its present appeal BAM Development can only challenge the 
additional 13-feet exaction, not the original 40-feet, under the Dolan rough proportionality test. 
(a) How is Rough Proportionality to be Determined? 
In conducting its "rough proportionality review" on remand, the trial court first found 
that the "impact" of BAM's proposed development was a projected increase of 3.04% in traffic 
volume in the relevant "traffic link" (i.e., the segment of 3500 South street between 7200 West 
and 8400 West streets).31 The trial court then found that the "exaction" consisted of a 
dedication of land owned by BAM equal to 1.89% of the entire relevant parcel owned by BAM, 
or also equal to 2.22% of the available building lots owned by BAM32. The court then 
28
. Trial Court "FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
ON REMAND," ["Order"] Jan. 11, 2007, p.6, f 1 [R. 554-561]. 
29
. B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, f 7 n.2, 128 P.3d 
1161 
30
. Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d 466 (state administrative 
remedies must be exhausted before state constitutional takings claim is ripe for judicial 
review). 
31
 See "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Remand"["Order"], 
January 11, 2007, Findings of Fact ff 18-20 [R. 558]. 
32See Order, Findings of Fact 1fl[22-26 [R. 559]. 
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determined that using either of the foregoing methods of measuring the exaction, the result was 
"roughly proportionate" to the impact of the proposed development33, and that the County had 
made the requisite "individualized determination" of such proportionality34. In so finding, the 
trial court implicitly defined the "exaction" as a percentage of the landowner's total property 
(measured by square footage or number of building lots), and then numerically compared that 
percentage to the percentage by which BAM's proposed subdivision was expected to contribute 
increased traffic within the relevant traffic link (i.e., 3.04%). 
Arguably, the trial court's Order may be inartful or lacking because it fails to make 
another possible "rough proportionality" comparison, i.e., to compare the 3.04% traffic 
"impact" to the percentage of the road area within the relevant traffic link represented by the 
land dedication required by the County. Such comparison directly determines whether the J_3 
additional feet ("exaction") is related in nature and extent to address the additional 440 vehicle 
trips per day that the proposed development will generate ("impact")35. 
33
 See Order, Conclusions of Law f 5 [R. 560]. 
34
 See Order, Conclusions of Law TJ6 [R.560]. 
35 
Although this specific method of comparing "impact" to "exaction' is not set forth in 
the trial court's Order, it is nonetheless preserved in the trial record and may serve to affirm 
the Order under the "affirmance on other grounds" doctrine. "[A]n appellate court may 
affirm a 'judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by the 
lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 
(1969)). See also, 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 714 (1993) ("Generally, the appellate court may 
affirm the judgment where it is correct on any legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, 
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Although not reflected in the Order, evidence of such a comparison was, in fact, received 
by the trial court. During the October 17, 2006 remand trial, the County's transportation 
engineer, Andrea Pullos, testified regarding a traffic study which she conducted during the 
development approval process in 1998 as follows: 
Q. "What was your particular role in doing this traffic study? What was the nature 
of your assignment? 
A. Initially when I get a development I look at it for transportation impacts. When 
the appeal came in, I looked at it to see what kind of specific impacts the number 
of trips that the development would put onto the road way. 
Q. What is the concern that you're addressing in that kind of study? 
A. I look at a development to make sure that it's not putting an undue amount of 
traffic onto the roadway. I also look at it to, as a general rule get a feel for - and 
to use the words we've been using today relative [sic] proportionality, is my 
requirement of the dedication outlandish, is it just out there or is it kind of 
balanced and within needs." 
Q. You identified that [7200 West to 8400 West] link in the post-it note, correct 
[referring to Exhibit D-58, the witness' handwritten traffic study calculations]? 
A. Correct. 
Q. 7200 West to 8400 West? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then we have the 1998 14,000. Tell us what hat means. 
A. I just took a standard growth rate that is within the county or was in the county 
at the time of about three percent per year and that brought us up to about 14,000 
vehicles per day average daily traffic along 3500 south in that segment of the 
road. 
Q. And was that three percent figure at that time a standard in traffic engineering 
regardless of the ground, reason, or theory adopted by the trial court."). Moreover, [a] party 
to an appeal does not have a constitutional right to have a cause of action decided on a 
particular ground." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
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business? 
A. It was a standard for Salt Lake County. 
Q. All right. So using that multiplier what did you come up with? 
A. Basically what I look at level of service those would be the letters on the right 
[Ex. D-58], a two-lane roadway would be a level service F where the roadway's 
basically failing, and a three-lane roadway by adding that center turn land you 
bring it up to a D, you get more capacity on the roadway." 
Q. "So your understanding based on certain data was that in 1998 you had 
approximately 14,000 vehicle trips per day on this segment of 3500 South and 












"... Now, if we take a look at another method of calculating or attempting to 
determine proportionality, we might say what percentage of the total growth area 
of that lane [of] 3500 South between 7200 [West] and 8400 [West] is represented 
by the area consisting of the dedication which we've said is 11,696 square feet. 
Did you prepare this original document provided [inaudible]? 
My staff did and I reviewed and approved it. 
And are you certain that the numbers as you have here are correct? 
Yes. 
Okay. Did you determine that the distance of a [sic] 3500 South between 7200 
West and 8400 West to be 7,968.26 feet? 
Yes. 
All right. And then how did you determine the total area of that lane on 3500 
South? 
I took that by the 106 proposed width. 
And what did you get? 
844,635.56 square feet. 
And so the portion that was required to be dedicated by B.A.M. 11.6 was what 
percentage of the total area of that [inaudible]? 
1.38." 
See, attached App. 1 (excerpt of trial transcript, bench trial on October 17, 2007 before 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson) [R. 572], 54:1. 17 - 55:1. 6; 57:1. 16 - 58:1. 12; 58:1. 13 -1. 
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17; 63: 1 in aA' ] 17. 36 In short, using BANPs proposed subdivision development, the 
projected population iirou th, and (irrentvehicle-trips-per-day data for the relevant traffic link, 
the County's transportation engineer determined that if not widened, the relevant segment of 
3500 South street would be in "failing" (i.e., overcapacity) status, thereby requiring at least one 
additional traffic lane within one year. 
So, thei i, > v1la! pet centage did the area of the BAM land dedication (i.e., 11,696 square 
feet) bear to the total area of 3500 South traffic link after such widening? Answer: 1.38% In 
other words, through the "exaction" imposed by the County, BAM was required to contribute 
an amount of land equal to 1.38% of tl le total area of tl le i oad aftei widei lit ig Once agaii I, this 
nir'l e "exaction imposed upon BAM yields a result which is "roughly 
proportionate" to the 3.04% traffic increase "impact" created b> BAM's proposed 
development37. 
As a variation on this method of comparison, one nnLrbi MM1 nnlv the portion <»f the road 
whiclI is being increased in width to meet increased traffic volume to calculate BAM's 
dedication as a percentage of the total road expansion. Thus, the road was expected to be 
expanded from its then-existing width of 33-feet38 (two lanes) to 106-feet (i.e., 53-feet on each 
36This evidence, and the calculations applied to the evidence, were not challenged 
by ABM at trial. 
37
 Actually, the "roughness" of the proportionality calciilations favor BAM. 
38
 The existing width of the road at the time of BAM's subdivision application was 
33-feet [R.572 (trial transcript), p. 24,11.17 - 25; p. 35,1. 7 - p. 36,1. 2]. 
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side of the center line). By this method of determining "rough proportionality," BAMPs 
dedication equals 2.01% of the total expanded area of the road. 
This calculation is made as follows: 
106 feet (total road width after expansion) 
33 feet (original road width before expansion) 
= 73 feet (expanded road width) 
^ H* ^ 
73 feet 
x 7968.26 feet (length of traffic link) 
= 581,683 sq. ft. (area of the expanded roadway) 
H^  H* ^ 
11,696 sq. ft. (area of BAM's land dedication) 
-*• 581,683 sq. ft. (area of expanded roadway) 
2.01% 
Once again, this alternative method of comparing impact to exaction results in a roughly 
proportionate outcome: I (3.4%) ~ e (2.01%). That is. the impact of the development upon 
traffic traveling within the relevant roadway (i.e., the "traffic link") is roughly proportionate to 
the percentage by which BAM's land dedication (exaction) will contribute to the expansion of 
the same roadway. 
Though this particular mode of comparison is not reflected in the trial court's findings 
and conclusions, the underlying evidence supporting this analysis is contained in the trial 
record, and it may represent the most meaningful comparison of a development's impact upon 
public infrastructure with certain assets - here, land for additional traffic lanes (i.e.. exaction) 
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- required by government to address that impact. A governmental entity's reqilired 
corni niti nent of si icl i assets by a developer in response to a development's impact is, by 
definition, the "exaction" at issue in any given case. In this case, the exaction - whether 
measured by this or any other formula - clearly is roughly proportionate to the impact created 
by BAM's subdivision. 
(b) Whether Rough Proportionality Occurs by Design or by Coincidence is Irrelevant 
BAM repeatedly argues that these various calculations merely produce values bearing 
a "numerical correlation" to BAM's 3.4% traffic impact which is "strictly coincidental."39 
BAM then argues that because the "matl lei i latical correlation" show t i between tl ic Coi inty's 
exaction ; BAM's impact (on traffic volume) is merely "coincidental," the County's 
legal analysis must be "both out-of whack and flawed."40 
BAM's argument fails for two reasons. First, BAM cites no authority for the implicit 
proposition that somehow i: ^ "rouph • • ••••• . . •,, i
 v^  e v e n where s i 
proportionality exists, if it occurs by "coincidence." Whether by design or by accidental 
coincidence, if the exaction and the impact are roughly proportionate, then Dolan holds that the 
"takings" clause is satisfied. 
Second, H \l\i \ argument is fundamental I \ illi MMOII! III -iiirh 'Yonii'idrntv1' did not exist, 
39See BAM's Brief, pp. 21, 23, 25, 28. 
40Id., p. 26. Actually, however, the County agrees with BAM's view that Dolan's 
prescription of proportionality in both "nature and extent" translates to an approximate 
equivalency that is both qualitative and quantitative. Id., p. 20. 
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and the result was that the impact and the exaction were clearly dispr 'u- rte, then flic 
govem.rn.ei it woi ild be t eqi lit eel to pay just compensation for a taking41. In this appeal, the 
County does not suggest that government should avoid liability for a taking even where rough 
proportionality is absent42. 
That is clearly the reason why governmental entities are required by Dolan to make an 
"it idiv ii ii lalized determination" as to whether rough proportionality exists.43 That way, if the 
scope and nature of the government's planned improvement project clearly exceeded - i.e., 
were disproportionate to - the impact of the landowner's proposed development, the 
government would need to either downsize its project plat is, or expect to pa> foi thei n„44 That 
41
 In addition to these flaws in BAM's argument, the issue should not be 
considered because it is inadequately briefed and therefore should not be considered on 
appeal. 
42BAM repeatedly criticizes the County for having taken an "inconsistent" 
approach, both at trial and on appeal, in BAM I, as compared to its position in the instant 
appeal, and recites from the County's briefing in BAM I to establish that inconsistency. 
See BAM's Brief, Section C, pp. 35 - 40, and Attachments 3 and 4. It is absolutely true 
that in BAM I, the County argued that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test should not 
apply to uniformly-applied legislative schemes such as a county highway-dedication 
ordinance. However, the Utah Supreme Court determined otherwise. In the current 
context of this dispute, the County argues that even when the Dolan rough-proportion 
test is applied, the County's exaction of land in this particular case, passes muster, 
43The trial court here specifically found that the County had made such an 
"individualized determination." See Order, Finding ^|21, conclusion [^6 [R. 558, 560]. 
44BAM's tedious "Hypothetical Examples" and ''Suggested Methodologies'Xsee 
BAM's Brief, pp. 28 - 35) merely reinforce the County's position. In these examples, 
BAM merely suggests that in certain other circumstances (not the circumstances that exist 
in this case), there would be a lack of proportionality between the government's 
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is the essence of the Dolan fonrm * his case, the impact and t! le exactioi 1 ti uly are 
roughl \ pu »poi1 innate, and all of BAM's efforts to lecture the County and the court on proper 
"math and logic"45 actually turn logic and common sense on their heads in a tortured effort to 
deny that the phrase "rough proportionality" means exactly what it says. 
(c) The Required "Individualized determination" May be Made Post-Exaction 
Citing no authority, BAM argues that the individualized determination required by the 
rough proportionality standard must be undertaken before a land dedication exaction may be 
imposed.46 \11 courts that have considered the issue have held that a post-exaction 
individualized determination is sufficient.47 T1 - vv11) a post-exaction 
demanded exaction and the developer's impact. Clearly, in such cases, a "taking' would 
be found under Dolan. But such is not the case here. 
45




... [Ijhe governmental entity—SALT LAKE COUNTY—has the affirmative 
duty of making a pre-exaction 'individualized determination1... ." BAM's Brief, p.3; "... 
the COUNTY'S post-hearing mathematical calculation and derivation lf Id., p.30 n 4 
47
. See Hammer v. City of Eugene. 202 Or. App. 189, 198, 121 P.3d 693, 698 
(2005), cert, denied 127 S. Ct. 176, 166 L. Ed. 2d 42 (2006): "The prophylactic rule that 
plaintiff proposes prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process test. It asks whether 
the government made Dolan findings before imposing an exaction. The answer to that 
question tells us nothing about whether an exaction effected a taking. If the government 
did make findings, that fact alone does not indicate whether the findings were adequate to 
justify the conclusion that the exaction did not effect a taking. Likewise, the bare fact that 
the government did not make findings says nothing about whether the burden imposed by 
an exaction is related in nature and extent to the impact of the development. Plaintiffs 
proposed rule tells us nothing about whether justice requires compensation. In fact, in 
cases in which there is rough proportionality, the rule would saddle taxpayers with the 
burden of paying compensation that justice does not require. Only consideration of the 
nature and extent of an exaction and the impact of a proposed development, on their 
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individualized determination suffices is llial il sm/h ,i post-exactioi i detei i i iinati< in, (usually 
i 11 idei taken b> i t ti ial court when the exaction is subsequently challenged), reveals that no 
substantive violation occurred, then the fact that no /?re-exaction determination was made is 
inconsequential. Similarly, if such a post-exaction determination reveals that a substantive 
violation did occur, the reviewing court can sii i ; * necessary remedy for the 
substai itiv e \ iolatioi i.48 Once again, BAM's argument finds no support in the case law. 
3. 
The trial court correctly determined that no violation of the Equal Protection clause of 
the United States Constitution, or the "uniform operation of laws" clause of the IItah 
Constitution, occurred in this case 
Although not entirely clear, it appears that, in addition to the state and federal Just 
merits, can reveal whether the rough proportionality requirement is met. Thus, when, as in 
this case, a landowner first challenges an exaction in an inverse condemnation action, the 
government must be permitted to make its case that rough proportionality existed at the 
time of the exaction. 
See also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. Partnership. 71 S.W.3d 
18, 41 (Tex. App. 2002)(considering whether Town established in the trial court that road 
improvement exactions were in substance roughly proportional to the negative public 
consequences of subdivision), affd 35 S.W.3d 620, 644 (Tex. 2004)("Stafford argues that 
the Town was required to make this [individualized] determination before imposing the 
condition on development, but we agree with the court of appeals that while the 
determination usually should be made before a condition is imposed, Dolan does not 
preclude the government from making the determination after the fact"); Ehrlich v. City 
of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 433 
(1996)(remanding case for additional proceedings to give city post-exaction opportunity 
to make individualized determination satisfying rough proportionality standard). 
48
 Hammer, supra. 202 Or. App. 189, 196, 121 P.3d 693, 697 (2005), cert, denied 
127 S. Ct. 176, 166 L. Ed. 2d 42 (2006)(M[T]he Takings Clause is concerned not with 
process, but rather with substantive restrictions on government authority."). 
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Compensation Clauses, B A M seeks to appeal on the groi n ids of tl ic federal Eqi ml 1 }i ot action 
Due Process Clauses, as well as under the state constitution's Uniform Laws provision. 
Each of these claims were dismissed by the trial court in B A M I, and were not expressly 
adjudicated on appeal. 
(A) Due Process and Equal Protection Claims are Subsumed under Just Compensation 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that both Due Process and Equal Protection 
Claims are subsumed under the Piist Compensation Clause and cannot be asserted 
independently.4 9 Other courts are split.50 These cases are premised on specific-clause-over-
general-clause reasoning, tl mt tl :te more specific In ist Cot i ipeii.sa.tion Clai lse prevails ov :t the 
more general Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.51 Thus, under the federal takings law 
49
. Bateman v. City of West Bount i ful 89 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996)(both due 
process and equal protection claims are subsumed under Just Compensat ion Clause). 
50
. C L Simi Inv. Co.. Inc. v. Harris County. Tex., 236 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2000), 
reh'g en banc denied, 256 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2001) and cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 550, 151 
L. Ed. 2d 426 (U.S. 2001) (Due Process clause claim is not subsumed in Just 
Compensat ion clause claim) with Macri v. King County. 110 F.3d 1496 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(substantive due process claims are collapsed into Just Compensat ion Clause claim); 
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County. 121 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 1997) (due process 
claim collapsed into Just Compensation Clause claim); Bateman v. City of West 
Bountiful. 89 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996)(both due process and equal protection 
claims are subsumed under Just Compensation Clause). See also 3 C. Dallas Sands, 
Michael E. Libonati & John Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW,§ 16.50, n..16 
(consideration of whether Due Process claims are subsumed under Just Compensation 
claims). 
51
. The principal sources for the specific-clause-over-general-clause reasoning are: 
Graham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), in 
which the Court held that "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection against [excessive force by police] , that Amendment , 
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of this Circuit, BAM cannot assert Due Process and Equal Protection claims because it is 
already asserting Just Compensation Claims. 
(B) Uniform Laws, Equal Protection and Due Process Claims are Subject to 
"Rational Relationship" Standard 
If considered on their merits, BAM's "Uniform Laws, " "Equal Protection" and "Due 
Process"claims also fail. First, the central concern of the Uniform Laws clause of the Utah 
Constitution is that persons similarly situated should be treated similarly.52 As such, it parallels 
the federal Equal Protection clause.53 The Utah Supreme Court interprets the Uniform Laws 
provision independently, but quite similarly to the federal Equal Protection Clause.54 
Accordingly, by analogy here, BAM's Uniform Laws claim is subsumed under its state Just 
Compensation Clause claim. 
Even if the Uniform Laws Clause does provide BAM with a right independent of the 
state Just Compensation Clause, the standard of judicial review is deferential to the County. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that a classification is "uniform" if it is a "reasonable basis for 
not the more generalized notion of Substantive due process,1 must be the guide for 
analyzing these claims"; and Whitley v. Albers. 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 
89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), which refused to consider a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
claim by a prison inmate for excessive force because the Eighth Amendment "serves as 
the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners" in such cases. 
52:
. State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, ^  33, 114 P.3d 585. 
53
. State v. Merrill. 2005 UT 34, % 32, 114 P.3d 585. 
54
. See, e.g.. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669-70 (Utah 1984). 
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promoting [legitimate] governmental objectives."55 "First, a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class."56 
Here, BAM Development was treated similarly to all members of the class consisting 
of owners of land abutting 3500 South (and other highways). Although BAM argues that other 
owners are treated more favorably, such persons did not own land that abuts 3500 South. 
There was no disparate treatment of similarly situated persons. "Second, the ... classification[] 
and the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute."57 Here, any different treatment of other 
persons owning land abutting 3500 South would be related to the development of their lands. 
If such development is different, imposing different burdens on the use of 3500 South, then 
different exactions would be justified. 
Similarly, even if the Due Process Clause provides a right independent of the state Just 
Compensation Clause, the modern perspective is that the Clause considers only whether 
governmental conduct is valid, whereas the Just Compensation Clause considers whether 
governmental conduct imposes an inordinate burden on the owner. Thus, in Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005), the Court held that the Just Compensation 
Clause protects against untoward burdens on the property rights of an owner, not on the 
55
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logically antecedent inquiry about the validity of governmental conduct. The Court emphasized 
that whether governmental action is valid is the province of the Due Process Clause, under 
which courts exercise deferential judicial review to determine whether a legitimate 
governmental objective is sought to be achieved through means that are reasonably likely to do 
so, whereas the Just Compensation Clause is a separate inquiry, focusing on the nature and 
extent of the burden imposed on the owner.58 Accordingly, even if a separate Due Process claim 
is available, BAM cannot demonstrate the County's exaction is not authorized by state statute 
and local ordinance. 
(C) BAM's Claims for Subdivision Improvement Costs are Meritless 
(1) The Court of Appeals Should Decline to Address the Issue - Ripeness 
Again, BAM attempts to resurrect its claim for recovery of its expenses for subdivision 
improvements which were required as conditions of County approval of the proposed 
development. This claim was also dismissed by the trial court in BAM I, and was not 
addressed by the Court of Appeals decision therein. BAM did not seek Supreme Court review 
on this claim in its petition for certiorari and, consequently, the improvement cost claims was 
not among the three issues specified by the Supreme Court for certiorari review. 
58
. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. 544 U.S. 528, 539, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 
(2005)("Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified, 
these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common 
touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the 
classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the 
owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the 
severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights."). 
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Subdivision improvements, which are routine conditions for county or municipal 
approval, typically include items such as installation of streets, curb, gutter, sidewalks, fences, 
water and sewer lines, storm drainage, etc.. In BAM I, Judge Orme, in his dissenting opinion, 
analyzed and rejected these claims when BAM made similarly opaque arguments about the 
improvement costs.59 As Judge Orme pointed out, there was a serious question whether BAM 
59
 "A different conclusion is reached, however, on the question of whether BAM properly 
preserved its objection to the County's requirement that certain in-kind improvements be 
made. On appeal, BAM challenges, to an unclear extent, a number of improvements required 
by the County as a condition to subdivision approval, including installation of curbs, gutters, 
stormdrain lines, sidewalks, and fencing. BAM argues that such improvements are 
"unconstitutionally excessive and/or unreasonable." The only possible evidence of 
preservation of this argument in BAM's written appeal to the Board of County 
Commissioners is in BAM's objection to the County's "increased expenses." Even under the 
most liberal construction of BAM's notice of appeal, it cannot be said that this issue was 
sufficiently raised such that the Board of County Commissioners should have been conscious 
of it. [] Furthermore, even if BAM had properly preserved this argument, BAM advances 
no convincing argument that the County's improvement requirements should be invalidated, 
or for that matter even analyzed, under Nollan and Dolan [footnote omitted]. The County 
cannot force BAM to dedicate and improve 3500 South based solely on its own 
transportation planning goals, rather than on the impacts of BAM's subdivision, because this 
would force BAM "alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole." Nevertheless, there is "an important distinction between 
ordinances requiring installation of streets, sidewalks, sewers and drainage facilities which 
are inextricably tied to the needs of the subdivision development, and those ordinances which 
require dedication of land ... where the nexus between the use requirement and the 
subdivision development is less than evident."[] See also Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas 
County. 142 Or.App. 327,922 P.2d 1227,1234 (1996) ("[Conditions that in whole or in part 
serve the needs of the development itself should be weighed differently than pure 'exactions' 
of the kind that serve only to mitigate an impact of the development on the public or public 
facilities."). [] For example, the County's requirement that BAM install a fence and a 
sidewalk along the portion of its property abutting 3500 South seems to be "inextricably tied 
to the needs of [BAM's] subdivision," []because such improvements undoubtedly inure to 
the convenience and safety of the subdivision residents. In any event, absent proper 
preservation at the County Commission level and a well-developed argument on appeal, 
BAM's objection to the County's in-kind improvement requirements need be addressed no 
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properly preserved this issue. This time around as well, since there is no mention or citation of 
the record in BAM's brief, BAM did not properly raise the issue either in the administrative 
proceedings before the County or in the trial court, and the issue is both "procedurally barred 
and inadequately briefed," and therefore should not be considered.60 
Alternatively, if the subdivision "improvement cost" claims are considered on their 
merits, they fail for lack of ripeness. A takings claim must be ripe before it may be presented 
for judicial determination. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, et. al., 121 S.Ct. 2448, 533 U.S. 606, 
150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001), the Supreme Court articulated its takings ripeness rule as follows: 
...a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the 
opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach 
of a challenged regulation. Under our ripeness rules a taking claim based on a 
law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends 
upon the landowner's first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to 
allow regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in considering 
development plans for the property, including the opportunity to grant any 
variances or waiver allowed bylaw. As a general rule, until these ordinary 
procedures have been followed the extent of the restriction on property is not 
known and the regulatory taking has not been established. 
Id., 121 S.Ct. at 2459. It is imperative that before a takings claim may be addressed by a court, 
"... the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reach a final decision 
regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Williamson County 
further."(Citations omitted) .B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 
App 34, fflf 51-53, 87 P.3d 710, 725-726. 
60
. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)("While failure to cite to 
pertinent authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when 
the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research to the 
reviewing court.") 
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Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). In 
Palazzolo, the Supreme Court added that "[t]he central question is resolving the ripeness issue, 
under Williamson County and other relevant decisions, is whether petitioner obtained a final 
decision from the Council determining the permitted use for the land." Palazzolo, supra, 121 ^ 
S.Ct. at 2458 (emphasis added). 
BAM asserts anew that the trial court erred in finding that the only claim BAM was able 
to bring before it was for the allegedly unconstitutionally excessive exaction of requiring an 
increased highway road-width dedication of 53 feet (measured from the center line of 3500 
South street). As the trial court concluded in BAM I, 
"since the only issue appealed by BAM to the County Board of Commissioners, 
and thus preserved by exhaustion of administrative remedies, was the County's 
requirement of a 53-foot highway dedication, rather than a 40-foot dedication, 
that is the only issue properly before this Court." 
[R. 266 - 273 (Conclusions of Law, f 1), BAM I]. It is generally true that no 'exhaustion of 
remedies' requirement applies to cases brought under 42 USC §1983." The "ripeness" and 
"exhaustion" doctrines, while distinct, are very closely related in a takings claim. Under 
Palazzolo and Williamson County, supra, exhaustion of remedies only occurs when the land-use 
authority has rendered a "final decision" on the landowner's application. Only then is a takings 
case ripe for judicial review. Hence, a landowner must exhaust his administrative remedies, 
thereby obtaining a "final decision," before a case will attain ripeness. 
Here, however, it is well established that BAM never sought or obtained a final decision 
from the County regarding any claim except its objection to the increase in the road-width 
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requirement from 40-feet to 53-feet. Under the "ripeness" doctrine, the scope of the legal issues 
presented to the trial court was defined and limited by the extent to which BAM preserved its 
claims through exhaustion of its administrative remedies, and received a "final decision" from 
the County on those claims. BAM followed the appeal procedure outlined in Utah's land use 
appeals statute and corresponding Salt Lake County ordinance, but chose only to appeal the 
issue of the increased right-of-way requirement in the preliminary approval of BAM's 
subdivision plat. BAM's "Notice of Appeal" to the County Board of Commissioners simply 
stated that BAM 
"hereby appeals ... from that certain June 23rd [1998] decision of the Salt Lake 
County Planning andZoning Commission (sic), denying 'development approval' 
for the above-referenced subdivision development with the 3500 South Street 
roadway at the '40-foot half-width right-of-way.'" 
[R. 572 (Trial, October 17, 2006, Ex. D-57)]. Although it now attempts to assert a claim for 
the "excessive" costs it was required to pay for standard subdivision improvements, BAM's 
administrative appeal did not challenge such standard requirements61. 
In short, the only issue raised on administrative appeal by BAM was the increase in the 
61Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances, Section 18.24, "Required Improvements." 
Regardless of where the required road-width dedication had been established, BAM 
would still be required by County ordinance to install storm drains, fencing, curb & 
gutter, sidewalk, etc.. Sec. 18.24 provides for the improvements which generally will be 
required of a subdivision developer as a condition of plat approval. They include storm 
and sanitary sewer systems (18.24.020, 025); storm drainage (18.24.030); street 
improvements (18.24.040); underground utility lines (18.24.060); pavement (18.24.080); 
curb & gutter (18.24.090);closure of ditches and canals (18.24.130,140); and solid 
fencing "where lots rear on a public street" (as occurred here) (18.24.145). The required 
improvements must be completed as a condition precedent to recordation of a final plat 
(18.24.010, 170, 190). 
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ROW from 40 to 53 feet. Since no other issues were administratively appealed, no other issues 
received a "final decision" by the County. Therefore, the only issue ripe for takings judicial 
review is the increase in the required highway dedication from 40 feet to 53 feet. BAM's claim 
for recovery of subdivision improvement is, therefore, barred. 
CONCLUSION 
BAM's brief fails to marshal the evidence and cite the record as required by the 
applicable rules. Further, the trial court correctly determined that the County made an 
"individualized determination" of "rough proportionality" between the required development 
exaction and the likely impact of BAM's proposed subdivision development. The methodology 
employed by the trial court to apply the "rough proportionality" test was reasonable. Whether 
rough proportionality occurs by design or by "coincidence" is irrelevant. The record 
establishes that the County made the requisite "individualized determination," and such 
determination may be made "post-exaction." 
The trial court also originally determined correctly that no violation of the Equal 
Protection clause of the United States Constitution, or the "uniform operation of laws" clause 
of the Utah Constitution, occurred in this case. Finally, BAM's claims for subdivision 
improvement costs are meritless, and the Court of Appeals should decline to address the issue 
for lack of ripeness. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed all claims against the County and 
should therefore be affirmed. 
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DATED this TJr* day of July, 2007. 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
DWALDH. HANSEN 
Deputy District Attorney 
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